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THE SURVIVAL OF NATIONAL BARGAINING
IN THE ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING INDUSTRY:
A DEVIANT CASE?
Howard Gospel and Jan Druker
One seemingly incontestable fact about British industrial relations over
the last quarter century is the decentralisation of private sector
collective bargaining from multi-employer level to the level of the
enterprise, division, or plant.  This article explores what is often seen to
be a deviant case, namely the electrical contracting industry, where
multi-employer national bargaining is claimed to have remained strong.
This resilience would seem to be despite the fact that, on a priori
grounds, given industrial structure and work organisation, multi-
employer bargaining would seem unlikely in this industry.  The first
part of the paper briefly outlines the wider context of collective
bargaining trends in British industry.  In the second section, the
development of collective bargaining arrangements in electrical
contracting is outlined.  The third section then investigates recent
developments and the degree to which arrangements in the industry
have deviated from the rest of the private sector.  In the final section
explanations are offered and implications are explored.   The industry’s
bargaining arrangements are seen as having some positive outcomes in
terms of the regulation of self-employment, employee benefits, and
training.
1. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STRUCTURE
The broad story of the development of collective bargaining in Britain
is well known.  In the early twentieth century, where collective
bargaining existed, it was decentralised and informal at workplace
level, usually covering only skilled male workers.  However, a few
industries had created regional and national procedural agreements and
2some had also created substantive frameworks of wages and conditions
(Clegg et al,  1964).  National bargaining developed further in the First
World War period and the creation of Whitley-style National Joint
Industrial Councils extended the pattern of multi-employer bargaining
to a broader spread of industries.  Despite the pressures of the interwar
years, national bargaining survived, though often in minimal form.  The
Second World War further extended the coverage of national multi-
employer  bargaining (Clegg, 1994).
In the post-war period, and increasingly in the 1960s, national
collective bargaining in the private sector came under pressure and
began to disintegrate.  A number of causes have been suggested for this:
the skeletal nature of many national agreements and their inability to
regulate changing circumstances at workplace level; full employment
and a shift of power to local bargainers; increased product market
pressures on firms, especially in terms of growing international
competition; and the attempt by many companies, themselves
increasingly multi-plant and multi-product, to gain improvements in
labour utilisation via domestic arrangements.  Under these pressures,
local shop steward bargaining grew; wages drifted above national
agreements; and national disputes procedures increasingly failed to
regulate workplace industrial relations (Donovan, 1968).  In part at
government prompting, but also at employer initiative, through the
1970s, firms left their employers’ organisations and bargained,
primarily or exclusively, at company or plant level.  In the changed
circumstances of the 1980s, this trend towards internalisation and
decentralisation was taken further as firms sought to gain the industrial
relations initiative and to reshape arrangements to suit their corporate
strategies and structures.  National agreements were terminated in a
spread of industries, from old-established sectors such as engineering to
newer areas such as banking.  Even where national bargaining survived,
such as in parts of printing, textiles, and clothing, it has been of
diminishing relevance and sets only a minimum safety net of terms and
conditions.  Simultaneously, the coverage (in terms of numbers) and
scope (in terms of topics) of collective bargaining began a sharp decline
(Brown and Walsh, 1991; Brown, 1993; Milner, 1995).
3Survey evidence supports this general story.  Thus, in the late
1960s, the Donovan report showed that multi-employer bargaining was
widespread; just over 20% of the workforce was covered by industry
rates which were generally adhered to; while 45% were covered by
industry rates which were substantially exceeded; and the rest fell
somewhere in between (Donovan, 1968: Appendix 5).  By the mid-
1970s, in manufacturing establishments with more than 200 employees,
although national agreements affected wages in about half the total
number of workplaces, this level of bargaining was the most important
for less than one fifth of manual workers (Daniel, 1976; Brown and
Terry, 1978: 128).  Later, Brown and colleagues found that, in
manufacturing establishments with 50 or more employees, multi-
employer agreements were the predominant form of pay bargaining for
just over a quarter of manual and less than a tenth of non-manual
employees (Brown (ed) 1981: 118).  By the time of the 1984
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) (covering
establishments above 25 employees) it was clear that multi-employer
pay agreements had continued to decline (Millward and Stevens,
1986). The 1990 WIRS further demonstrated the reduced importance
of multi-employer arrangements:  between 1984 and 1990, the number
of manufacturing workplaces where this was the most important level
of pay bargaining declined from 22 to 16% for manuals, although
showing a slight rise from 5 to 7% for non-manuals.  In private services
multi-employer bargaining diminished from 20 to 11% for manuals and
from 11 to 5% for non-manuals (Millward et al, 1992: 221).
       These trends have been seen as part of a broader international
movement towards the decentralisation of collective bargaining.  Katz
(1993) points to broad similarities in a spread of countries in respect of
decentralisation which he explains in a number of ways.  First, he gives
some weight to a shift in bargaining power away from unions and
towards employers who, he argues, for the most part, favour
decentralised bargaining.  Second, he suggests that the diversification of
worker and employer interests may have played a part in
decentralisation:  more diversified firms want to bargain internally and
to set wages and conditions according to their product lines; a growing
4diversity of worker interests means that centralised bargaining has less
appeal to them.  Third, and most significant for him, he stresses
changes in work organisation which put a premium on flexibility and
employee participation which can be best achieved through
decentralised bargaining.  These explanations provide a useful
reference point for examining change and continuity in bargaining
structures.  However, we suggest that a full understanding requires that
specific arrangements be put in a particular national, sectoral, and
industrial context and take account of historical legacies; only then can
a ‘deviant’ case be understood.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN
ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING
The strength of the national multi-employer agreement in electrical
contracting has often been referred to in the industrial relations
literature.   For example, a Commission on Industrial Relations report
in 1972 stated, ‘In this industry there exists the best known example of
an industry-wide standard wage rate... with one of the main examples
of a comprehensive agreement’ (CIR, 1972: 23, 69).  A survey in 1980
stated that, ‘The electrical contracting industry is probably the “jewel
in the crown” of multi-employer bargaining’ (Beaumont, Thompson,
and Gregory, 1980: 134).  Later, an Advisory Conciliation and
Arbitration Service report concluded, ‘The electrical contracting
industry … remains an interesting and unusual bargaining arrangement,
but it has been almost unique in having a multi-employer agreement
strictly observed, with no local additions, throughout the entire
industry’ (ACAS, 1983: 12).  Both Incomes Data Services and
Industrial Relations Services usually refer to the tight and
comprehensive nature of the industry’s agreements (IRS 1989: 440;
IDS,  1993: 10;  IRS 1993:544; IDS, 1994: 6).  In view of the
apparently deviant nature of the electrical contracting industry, these
claims deserve further examination in the contemporary context.
5The electrical contracting industry covers the installation and
wiring of electrical systems in industrial, commercial, and domestic
buildings, ranging from the small to the very large and from the
relatively simple to the highly sophisticated.  The industry is made up
of a small number of large enterprises, some medium sized firms, and a
large number of very small firms.  Over the last decade or so, there has
been a substantial increase in the number of very small firms and sole-
traders (Department of Environment, 1996: 41).  Given low capital
requirements and ease of entry, many former workers become self-
employed and small employers, and even medium-sized and some large
firms are family-owned and -controlled.  Though some of the larger
companies work outside the UK, most firms are purely domestic, and
the industry is largely protected from international competition.
Competitive pressures, however, can be fierce and are accentuated by
competitive tendering and marked fluctuations in the construction
business cycle.  In recent years, there has been a tendency for some of
the medium sized firms to specialise in particular areas of electrical
work, for larger firms to diversify their interests into broader electrical
installation and maintenance, and for electrical firms to be acquired by
general builders.
In 1994 82,000 were employed in the industry and over half of
these were manual workers (Department of the Environment 1996:
38).1 Among the latter, apprenticed or otherwise qualified electricians
constitute about 90% of the labour force (Joint Industry Board,
Handbook 1994: 7). Overall, labour costs represent a high proportion
of total costs, averaging about two-thirds of the cost of jobs, and are
therefore a crucial factor in competition.  The work itself involves
operating on site, in many instances unsupervised, and electricians
enjoy a high level of work autonomy.  Some contracts are long-term,
involving large projects or firms providing permanent subcontract
support for another firm; many others are short, involving mobility
between sites and between employers.  Self-employment is widespread,
though, as we will see, less than elsewhere in the construction industry.
From an industrial relations perspective, the employers’
organisation in the industry has always been the Electrical Contractors’
6Association (ECA).  This has a membership of 1,926 companies in
England, Wales, N. Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland.  A separate
association exists in Scotland, though this largely follows the lead set
by the ECA.  The Association comprises one-fifth of the total number
of employers in the industry.  However, it is not too realistic to view
density in terms of very small firms employing only a handful of
workers; the ECA claims that it represents all the large and most of the
medium sized firms and that their members carry out around 80% of
the work undertaken in the industry.  On the union side, the main
representative body has always been the Electricians’ Union, and
electrical contracting has always constituted one of its main centres of
membership.  Thus, the industry has been a route into the trade and
into trade unionism for many electricians, often before passing on to
other jobs in areas such as electricity supply or maintenance in
manufacturing industry.  In 1992 the Electrical, Electronic,
Telecommunications and Plumbing Trade Union (EETPU) joined with
the Engineers Union to form the Amalgamated Engineering and
Electrical Union (AEEU), a more general union organising workers in a
broad spread of industries and occupations.  In 1995 the merged union
had 725,000 members, of whom approximately 30,000 work in the
electrical contracting industry (Data supplied by AEEU).
A further key institution in the industry is the Joint Industry
Board (JIB).  This unique body in British industry was established in
1966 by the Contractors’ Association and the Electricians’ Union,
modelled on the practice then existing in New York City (Chapple,
1984: 111; Lloyd, 1990: 502).  The JIB is a joint institution, made up
of equal numbers of ECA and AEEU representatives, with its own
independent chairman, full-time chief executive, secretariat, and
offices, in large part financed through the flow of funds from the
stamps for the industry’s various benefit schemes.  The stated aim of
this permanent body is ‘to regulate and control employment and
productive capacity, the level of skill, and wages and benefits of
persons employed in the industry’ (JIB Handbook, 1994: 13).  From
the outset, this meant that the JIB has been involved in a wide range of
activities.  For example, it initially sought to organise the pool of
7labour in the industry and to act as a job finding agency.  Crucially, it
regulates training and certifies the level of competence of electricians
and places them into one of four grades (labourer, electrician, approved
electrician, and technician).  For these grades and for apprentices,
wages are fixed.  From the outset, the intention was that these ‘pay
determinations’ were to be standard, constituting both a minimum and
a maximum rate.  In addition, the JIB sets hours and holiday
entitlement; it provides insurance cover for accident and death in
service; it operates industry-wide sick pay and pension schemes; and
from 1980, it has provided free access to private medical treatment
through the British United Provident Association (BUPA) (JIB
Handbook 1994: 175).  In law, the JIB is unique in having an
exemption which takes unfair dismissals out of the hands of the
Industrial Tribunals system.
The interaction between these institutions can only be understood
in a historical context.  When the electrical contracting industry
developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, it proved
extremely difficult to regulate in both product and labour market terms.
Ease of entry, the proliferation of small firms, a dispersed and mobile
labour force, and competitive pressures made the industry difficult to
organise on the side of both employers and employees.  In these
circumstances, a number of early attempts at joint regulation collapsed.
However, from the First World War through the interwar years, there
developed a national system which was increasingly institutionalised
and centralised (Gospel, 1985).  Subsequently, from the Second World
War up into the early 1960s, pressures built up on these arrangements,
in part as a result of growing Communist Party domination of the
union.  This posed a threat to the national agreement in that it raised
the spectre among employers of politically motivated instability, and,
during these years, the industry’s arrangements exhibited some of the
disintegration which was occurring elsewhere.  At this stage, the
industry did not really seem to deviate from the main pattern in British
industry.
       The challenge to Communist domination and a famous ballot-
rigging case in 1961 ultimately brought to power a group on the right
8of the union.  This group proceeded to consolidate its position in an
already centralised organisation (Lloyd, 1990).  This suited the
employers’ desire for stability and predictability in the face of rising
inflation and industrial relations problems elsewhere.  Both sides saw
themselves as creating a new kind of relationship in British industry
when they signed the 1966 agreement, ‘A Transformation of
Management-Labour Relations’, which established the JIB.  Whilst
employers in other parts of the construction were faced with high levels
of industrial unrest, employers in electrical contracting sought refuge in
a closer working relationship with a strong trade union leadership.
Under this regime, the employers gave security to the union and good
pay and conditions to members; as a quid pro quo, the union promised
discipline and stability.  It is true that over the years there has been
recurrent shopfloor opposition to these arrangements, but this has
never been sufficient to destabilise them.  In the 1980s, leaders of the
EETPU positioned themselves on the radical right of the union
movement and differentiated their organisation from others which had a
more adversarial approach to relationships with employers.  Ultimately,
this stance led to conflict with the rest of the movement, and for a time
from the late 1980s the union existed outside of the Trades Union
Congress.  In this potentially de-stabilising situation, the relationship
with the employers, as institutionalised through the JIB, provided some
support for the union.
3. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ARRANGEMENTS
There have been a number of significant developments in electrical
contracting over the last 20 years which have affected the nature and
stability of industrial relations arrangements. One of the most important
among these has been the growth of self-employment.  Employer
preference for this form of labour has been stimulated by demand
uncertainties, a desire to avoid the costs of direct employment, and a
general climate of deregulation (Evans and Lewis, 1989; Druker and
9White, 1995).  Whilst self-employment in electrical contracting is
lower than in other parts of the construction industry, it was of growing
concern to the ECA in the 1980s.  Their surveys demonstrated
increased use of such labour, although with regional variation and
differences of view amongst members as to the merits of such
employment.  By 1993 it was estimated that 28% of the workforce
engaged by ECA firms was self-employed, although this is an
underestimate for the industry as a whole, since non-federated firms are
more likely to use self-employed labour.  There are also marked
regional differences with self-employment being used more in the
South and South-East (ECA, 1993).
        Self-employment threatens the stability of arrangements in the
industry in a number of ways.  First, it threatens organisation on the
part of both employers and employees since sub-contractors, relying on
self-employed workers, and workers, being paid by the task or by the
day without reference to negotiated rates, have less incentive to join
organisations which negotiate arrangements from which they are
excluded.  Second, it threatens the wage system in that self-employed
workers are more likely to receive wages which are fixed independently
of the national agreement.  Such workers may be paid less than
national agreements on the grounds that they do not pay tax; in boom
years, they may be paid more, because they do not receive other
benefits and do not feel bound by the agreement.  Third, the self-
employed do not participate in the non-wage arrangements of the JIB,
covering holidays, sick pay, and pensions, and this in turn undermines
the national framework.  Thus, national agreements are likely to apply
to fewer workers and there is likely to be a greater variation between
different categories within the workforce.
The industry has also been affected by growing competitive
pressures which have borne on the construction sector more widely.
Fluctuations in workload, resulting from variable interest rates and
investment levels, have been compounded by compulsory competitive
tendering for public sector work and by an intensification of cost
pressures on clients.  Some firms have moved into niche markets and
some larger firms have diversified into a wider range of electrical and
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electronic services.  Such changes have opened up competition and
undermined established practices, for example, by reducing the
possibility of collusion in terms of price-fixing and market-sharing
within the tendering process.  In the past this had been facilitated by
the ECA which was both an employers’ and a trade association and its
product market activities complemented multi-employer wage
regulation which sought to take wages out of competition (Gospel,
1985)
Such pressures have threatened the viability of national regulation
in the electrical contracting industry.  Yet the arrangements remained
strong up to the beginning of the 1990s and in many respects the
industry still remains a deviant case.  It is to various aspects of
continuity and change that the article now turns.
           In terms of organisation, membership of the ECA rose slightly
through the 1970s and 1980s, peaking with a membership of 2,433 in
1990, since when it has fallen to 1,926 in 1996, largely reflecting
mergers in recent years.  Density has not fallen among firms of a size
which the ECA considers to be its constituency, and it is claimed that
members continue to carry out around 80% of work in the industry.
Though comparable figures do not exist for other industries, this
stability of membership and level of density is certainly higher than that
for most other employers’ organisations.  In part this level of
membership reflects the historical traditions of employers and the
continued benefits provided by the system.  The ECA’s influence is
enhanced because it is also a trade association:  though there are now
stricter legal constraints on preferential trading and collusion than in
the past, the ECA does provide a forum and a set of services in support
of commercial interests.
It is more difficult to establish the movement in union
membership in electrical contracting.  Table 1 underestimates total
union membership because it largely excludes non-JIB electricians.  It
also overestimates the fall in membership in recent years which is in
part due to a temporary change in dues arrangements.  Density among
JIB electricians is high, since, unless workers express otherwise, union
membership is automatic through the JIB and covered by JIB income.
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Density has remained fairly constant over time.  However, in recent
years, an increasing proportion of electricians, particularly among the
self-employed, are outside of the JIB and less likely to be unionised.
Thus, the union represents a falling proportion of the workforce as a
whole.  Nevertheless, at an estimated 40% of the labour force, it is
higher than in construction more generally where it represents only
15%.2
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TABLE 1
Organisational Membership in Electrical Contracting 1975-95
ECA
Membership
EETPU/AEEU
Membership
JIB Employers JIB
Employees
1975 2123 2,680 33,746
1976 2148 32,960
1977 2151 2,678 33,213
1978 2099 2,742 35,741
1979 2193 2,746 34,677
1980 2248 31,274 2,697 34,814
1981 2232 32,095 2,671 31,998
1982 2251 29.801 2,612 29,196
1983 2192 28,809 2,538 29,644
1984 2183 28,507 2,491 30,948
1985 2179 28,668 2,507 32,710
1986 2262 28,038 2,517 32,121
1987 2296 28,432 2,539 31,542
1988 2268 28,393 2,590 31,334
1989 2406 27,726 2,495 30,801
1990 2433 29,096 2,527 30,664
1991 2412 30,466 2,499 30,957
1992 1987 29,018 2,451 29,438
1993 1958 24,993 2,357 26,308
1994 1930 22,854 2,218 24,842
1995 1930 20,607 2,155 23,584
1996 1926 20,014 2,119 22,925
Source: ECA; AEEU; JIB.  The AEEU figures for 1993, 1994, and
1996 are our estimates based on JIB figures.
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As Table 1 shows, coverage by the JIB has fallen from a peak in
the late 1970s.3  In terms of employers covered, membership fell by
23% between 1979 and 1996 and in terms of employees covered by
35% over the same period.  These figures can be taken as a rough proxy
for the extent of joint regulation in the industry.  Though there is a
decline, this would seem to be less than in most other industries where
joint bodies have ceased to exist and the coverage of collective
bargaining has declined precipitately.4  This has especially been the
case in other areas of construction.  It would also seem that JIB wages
and basic conditions, do seem to set a standard among many non-JIB
firms and spill-over throughout the industry, though with some
differentiation.5  Membership and density are, moreover, only one
measure of resilience and deviancy, and it is necessary to look in more
detail at the operation of the institutions.
As stated above, one of the main challenges for the industry has
been the growth of self-employment.  The employers and the union
have tried jointly to tackle this in various ways.  In the early years of
the JIB, the industry tried to ban self-employment altogether, with the
penalty of fines and expulsion.  This ban had some effect, and a few
firms were fined and others left the JIB.  However, this was a remedy of
limited value, since outsiders were then free to make unrestricted use of
such labour, thereby competing with some advantage over those who
remained in membership.  An alternative was to incorporate controls
over the use of self-employment into the agreement.  In the early
1980s, working rules were amended to permit the use of a minority of
self-employed labour where it could be shown to be unavoidable and
where the firm supplying such labour was a JIB member.  In addition,
the parties to the agreement established a labour supply agency to
provide workers to the industry on a self-employed basis.  The
intention was to ensure that JIB contributions were paid and that
members which mainly employed direct labour were thus not
disadvantaged.  In practice, however, this proved difficult to enforce
and presented legal problems concerning restrictive trade practices.
Though the union was consistently strongly opposed to self-
employment, there were growing divisions among the employers as to
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the desirability of self-employment.  In 1995 the rule was replaced by a
‘Code of Good Practice on the Temporary Use of Self-Employed
Operatives’ which allows employers to use self-employed labour when
they cannot otherwise resource their work through directly employed
staff.  More recently, the industry has considered allowing labour
agencies to join the JIB, but no agreement has yet been reached.  These
measures did not in themselves resolve the problems of self-
employment, but they do suggest a greater capacity to regulate this kind
of working than elsewhere in construction.  As a result, in electrical
contracting self-employment represents about a third of the labour
force compared to two-thirds in the rest of construction (ECA, 1993).
The importance of a national agreement may be judged by its
internal effectiveness and external impact.  In terms of external impact,
electrical contracting is a lead agreement in its sector.  Rates of pay
have consistently been higher than in building and civil engineering and
normal working hours have been reduced in advance of other
agreements within the sector.  In terms of internal effectiveness, the
closeness of negotiated pay rates to actual earnings is a key indicator of
the extent to which an agreement is applied in practice.  As already
stated, the intention at the outset was that rates should be standard and
should reward workers on the basis of their skill, irrespective of the
nature of the site, type of work, or profitability of the employer.
Table 2 expresses negotiated wage rates for the approved
electrician (representing 61% of the workforce) as a percentage of
earnings.  Overtime earnings have been excluded from the calculation
because of cyclical fluctuations in this component, so that negotiated
rates are compared with earnings inclusive of shift, payment by results,
and other payments and allowances.   It should also be noted that
payment by results and shift payments are low in the industry.6   The
resulting comparison between rates and earnings provides a crude
measurement of the continuing importance of the national agreement,
though some fluctuation is inevitable representing the accident of
settlement dates and the operation of incomes policies in the 1970s.
The comparison shows a remarkable continuity in the relationship over
15
most of the period and further evidence for the deviant nature of the
electrical contracting agreement.
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TABLE 2
Wage Rates as a Percentage of Earnings, 1968-1996
Date Approved
Electrician Rate
Date Approved
Electrician Rate
1968 83.3 1986 83.7
1971 95.6 1987 84.4
1972 95.0 1988 85.1
1975 93.0 1989 85.4
1979 83.7 1990 84.0
1980 82.4 1991 86.5
1981 81.0 1992 88.1
1982 84.9 1993 82.9
1983 86.4 1994 85.9
1984 86.1 1995 82.9
1985 90.7 1996 80.5
       Source: IDS and NES.
Variations from national agreements are of two kinds.  First, there
are those which are unintended by the national bodies, and which
autonomously and unconstitutionally add to, or subtract from, the
national agreement.  Second, there are those which are intended, and
which derive from the administration of the agreement at workplace
level and which constitutionally supplement the national agreement
(Sisson, 1987: 19).  Under the first heading, might be included
variations such as straightforward plus payments, bogus incentives and
bonuses, inflated expense and travel payments, unwarranted upgrading
and overtime, and completion payments.  These may be either provided
unilaterally by the employer or fixed bilaterally by informal bargaining
and are more likely to occur on large sites.  Such payments have always
existed in the industry, and, in the early years of the JIB, firms were
sometimes fined or expelled for having recourse to them.  Under the
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second heading, the industry’s wage system has made various
provisions for controlled flexibility.  First, from the early 1970s,
payment above the standard rate has been allowed for supervisory
responsibility, though the intention was that this should be small and
should be monitored by the JIB.  Second, from the mid-1970s,
‘controlled incentive schemes’ were allowed, but only after the scheme
had been approved by the JIB and where the base rate was fixed at a
percentage below the JIB rate (IDS, Report 127, December 1971, 5;
IDS Report 272, January 1978).  In practice, few such incentive
schemes were ever introduced.  Third, large sites have always
constituted a problem for employers because of  their vulnerability to
union pressure and leapfrogging.  From 1981, a new collective
agreement, the National Agreement for the Engineering Construction
Industry (NAECI), has set rates of pay and conditions on large sites
such as power stations, oil and chemical refineries, and manufacturing
plants, which are covered by a site agreement.  For electrical
contractors on these sites, a dispensation can be granted from paying
JIB rates in favour of NAECI rates.  This provides some flexibility at
these pressure points, ensuring a framework of established differentials
between trades which is transparent to the JIB.
 In terms of other conditions and non-wage benefits, the JIB
agreements on hours, overtime premia, and holidays continue to
provide rules for much of the industry, though the numbers formally
covered has declined with the fall in JIB membership.  Holiday pay,
sick pay, accident and death insurance, and pensions, all paid for by
employer contributions, are generous by the standards of the
construction industry.  The controversial BUPA scheme, introduced in
1980, and subsequently extended to cover white collar employees in
the industry, remains the largest single scheme in British industry with
over 30,000 members.  At site level in electrical contracting, the scope
of bargaining is constrained, but, at national level, formal bargaining
over a wide range of issues continues to take place.
Training has always been a key concern of the industry, reflecting
the skilled content of the work.  From the outset, to receive grading, a
worker’s apprenticeship or equivalent qualification has to be officially
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recognised.  Apprenticeship training is central and is closely regulated
by the industry.  Through the JIB the apprentice is registered;
employed status is mandated; rates of pay are determined; and the level
of theoretical and practical standards are fixed.  As Table 3 shows, the
number of apprentices in training has fluctuated over time, largely
reflecting the business cycle, but, on the whole, it has held up much
better than elsewhere in British industry (Rainbird, 1991; Agapiou et
al, 1995: 156; Gospel, 1996).  This deviance in terms of training
arrangements and outcomes reflects a number of factors.  It reflects the
customers’ desire for qualified and safe workmanship, and the JIB
grading system is widely acknowledged as evidence of training and
competence.  It also reflects the collective and proactive approach to
skill formation taken by the parties.  In the 1970s, the industry was
among the first to move towards training to specified national
standards.  Following a fall in apprentice numbers in the early 1980s
recession, the apprentice wage rate was in effect reduced so as to give
an incentive to employers to take on apprentices.  The industry has also
used its collective approach to turn government initiatives to its
advantage.  Thus, it was also quick to use Youth Training as a subsidy
for apprenticeship training, but not to replace apprentices with trainees
as occurred elsewhere in construction; it early introduced National
Vocational Qualifications, while retaining its own traditional
qualifications and skill tests; and it was one of the first industries to
institute a Modern Apprenticeship scheme which is essentially a
continuation of the industry’s own arrangements.  All this has been
done despite the fact that in 1989 the industry opted out of the
construction industry training levy arrangements, left the Construction
Industry Training Board, and established its voluntary own training
agency (JT Ltd).  In terms of further training, the grading scheme
provides a mechanism for motivating and rewarding skill formation;
and both the industry jointly and the employers and the union
separately provide a series of courses and facilities for skill upgrading.
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TABLE 3
Apprentices in Training
Year Apprentices Year Apprentices
1971 16,975 1984 10,978
1972 15,765 1985 10,220
1973 14,625 1986 10,701
1974 13,886 1987 11,777
1975 13,487 1988 12,952
1976 13,414 1989 14,792
1977 12,563 1990 16,555
1978 10,960 1991 17,092
1979   9,786 1992 15,675
1980 10,521 1993 14,299
1981 11,693 1994 13,473
1982 11,374 1995 12,595
1983   9,632 1996 10,229
Source: JIB.
National disputes procedures are less significant today than they
were a quarter of a century ago, and in this respect also electrical
contracting is a deviant case.  Of course, in all sectors there has been a
decline in strikes, but in electrical contracting this has not been
accompanied by a decline in the use of the national disputes procedure.
An average of 36 cases per year go to a formal dispute committee, and
there has been no downward trend in numbers (JIB Handbook, 1996:
174).  The industry operates a multi-stage procedure, consisting of
informal conciliation by ECA and union officers, with local, regional,
and national hearings.  The machinery is also used for handling unfair
dismissal cases since electrical contracting has uniquely since 1979
been given exemption from Industrial Tribunal legislation.  Cases are
often heard on site, without lawyers. with an equal number of
employer and union officials sitting on a case, with a JIB official
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present, and with provision for arbitration.  The cost of the system is a
cause for concern for some employers, not least because the qualifying
period is six months rather than the two years under the legislation and
because the industry rather than the state meets the costs.  Yet to date
there is a preference for this form of autonomous industrial self-
government.
In summary, the system of multi-employer regulation in the
electrical contracting industry has weakened somewhat since the
1970s.  It covers fewer workers and firms and there are significant
strains within the system.  However, in the context of the pressures on
the industry and compared with the deregulation elsewhere in British
industry, especially construction, the system remains significant both in
the scope of its application and in the standards which it sets.
4. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
One explanation for the deviant nature of national multi-employer
bargaining in electrical contracting relates to the sectoral characteristics
of the construction industry as a whole.  It might be argued that, in a
sector which (outside of major contracts) is largely closed to
international competition,  it is more feasible to maintain multi-
employer networks and sustain national agreements.  This is because
competitive cost pressures may be less strong than in more open sectors
and purely domestic firms can be more readily brought into such
agreements.  Indeed, there are other parts of the construction industry
where national agreements are still important.  These include the
building industry working rule agreement, the heating and ventilating
agreement, and other specialist areas such as plumbing and demolition
agreements.  The agreement which is most effective, apart from
electrical contracting, is that for the engineering construction sub-
sector.  This agreement (NAECI) was created in the early 1980s and
modelled on the JIB (Korczynski, 1996); it is effective because of the
dominance of a small number of large clients who need to ensure stable
industrial relations on big sites.  On the other hand, the national
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agreement in building is relatively weak; the agreement in civil
engineering has been de-stabilised by the recent disintegration of the
employers’ association; and the agreement in heating and ventilating
sets only recommended rates and conditions.  Also, we repeat again
some of the factors inimical to national organisation in construction —
the proliferation of small firms, the spread of self-employment, and
marked demand fluctuations.  A sectoral explanation does not
therefore fully explain the continued strength of national bargaining in
electrical contracting.
Another set of explanations, which might account both for the
relative strength of multi-employer national regulation and also for
recent changes within electrical contracting, relate to the specific
product and labour market structure of the industry itself.
In terms of product markets, where there is the reality or
possibility of fierce domestic competition between a large number of
firms, many of them small, there is an incentive to institute multi-
employer regulation.  First, this economises on the cost of bargaining
and providing benefits, especially for small and medium sized
companies.  As Katz (1993: 12) notes, employers in industries with
small scale production and modest capital requirements seem more
likely to retain central bargaining structures.  Second, in a classic
manner, multi-employer bargaining serves to take wages out of
competition and this increases the likelihood that firms, especially
small firms, will play by the same rules.  Third, industry bargaining
ensures a certain predictability in labour costs in tendering for
contracts.  In this respect, it is significant that, in the electrical
contracting wage determinations, the settlement is promulgated well in
advance of their implementation so as to facilitate costing.  Given these
factors, there is an incentive and possibility for employers and the
union to organise together to regulate their industry.
In terms of the labour market, the workforce is skilled, and wage
costs represent a high proportion of total costs.  Electricians consider
themselves a distinct elite in the construction industry, and, as we have
seen, they are more likely to be directly employed than other site
workers.  Of course, there are differences in skill and complexity
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between the types of work which are undertaken.  However, the labour
process is relatively homogeneous, there is a high degree of
occupational cohesion, and there is a high level of skills transparency.
For quality and safety reasons, clients prefer that work is done by an
accredited electrician, which has usually come to mean a JIB
accredited electrician.7  Given these factors, again there is an incentive
and a possibility of taking wages out of competition.
Powerful though these structural factors may be, they mainly
predispose the parties to acting in a certain way rather than
predetermining outcomes.  For a fuller explanation of the institutional
arrangements, it is necessary to examine the interplay of union and
employer preferences as a political process and in a historical context.
The Electricians’ Union has always been the predominant union
in the industry, and contracting has provided it with initial recruitment
into the union and with one a major centre of membership.  For reasons
already given, the industry is in many ways difficult for a union to
organise and to regulate.  To obtain employer recognition and the
protection of wages and conditions, especially among smaller firms, the
Electricians’ Union was prepared to enter into comprehensive national
agreements and to see these tightly enforced.  This was also attractive
to the leadership since historically it further reinforced their central
control and helped contain political challenges mounted by disaffected
members.  After the bitter struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, the new
leadership saw a tight national agreement and close working with the
employers as a means to reinforce its control.  In the early 1970s, it
gained recognition from the ECA of the Electrical Engineers Staff
Association as the sole bargaining agent for supervisory, technical, and
administrative staff.  It also needed security during the 1980s when its
membership elsewhere was declining and when relations with other
unions deteriorated.  The mutually interdependent relationship with
the ECA was perceived to lower the cost of organising and servicing
the membership and became a part of the union leadership’s culture.
In this way, the support of a centralised union has been a necessary
condition for strong national regulation.  However, by itself, the union
was not strong enough to enforce national bargaining, and union
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commitment would not, in itself, have persuaded employers that such
arrangements should be developed and retained.
In an uncertain environment, organised employers in electrical
contracting have always wanted to stabilise the industry and increase
predictability.  The predecessors of the ECA had historically used
product market collusion, price-fixing, and trading rebates to bring this
about.  Over time, the employers had accepted the need for a degree of
co-operation and regulation in the product market and for collective
discipline in the labour market.  As this seemed to pay off, the firms in
the industry were prepared to continue the system of multi-employer
regulation which had developed historically.  For them the creation of
the JIB was a significant event.  It signified a continuing commitment to
regulation and it further institutionalised relations.  For most employers
covered by the agreement, it has produced a degree of stability in the
industry, at both national and local level, and has tended to reduce
interfirm cost variation and thereby stabilise pricing and tendering in a
situation where market-sharing and price-fixing is now illegal.  The JIB
has itself come to be a significant player in the industry and, along with
other joint bodies especially in the training area, it has developed a
strong institutional centrality which permeates the industry.  Thus, the
majority of member firms continued to value the system, despite the
challenges and pressures which built up especially in the 1980s.
At the present time, however, there is new set of pressures on the
agreement and a questioning of the arrangements which may render
electrical contracting less deviant.  First, there is some fear on the part
of the employers that the merged AEEU may not have the same
understanding of, or commitment to, the arrangements as did the
Electricians’ Union over many years.  In practice, this is probably
unfounded as electricians’ representatives continue to have a high
profile within the AEEU and the union still very much sees the
arrangements as a way to retain membership.  More potentially
destabilising on the union side is its difficulty in making significant
gains in organising the self-employed.   Second, there may be a lack of
familiarity amongst younger self-employed workers with the role and
purpose of trade unions and the ways in which union membership
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might support their interests.  Third, and probably more important, are
waning memories on the part of many employers of the reasons for
setting up the arrangements in the first place, especially given lower
levels of militancy within the industry.  Fourth, a growing
diversification of activities within some larger firms, a concentration on
niche activities by other large and medium sized firms, mergers with
building firms, and an increasing divergence of interest between large
and smaller firms throws into question employer commitment and
solidarity.  In particular, it would seem that large firms, especially on
large sites, may find less and less community of interest with smaller
firms.  Finally, the spread of self-employment and the further
intensification of competition continue to pose increasing strains on the
industrial relations system.  If these trends continue, there may be less
incentive for employers to maintain industry regulation in the future.
Together these pressures are making for greater demands for flexibility
which in the future may make the industry less unique.
5. CONCLUSION
Multi-employer national bargaining has declined in most private sector
industries in Britain, and in general there has been a decentralisation
and contraction of collective bargaining.  However, national multi-
employer regulation has survived in some industries and in particular in
the construction sector.  It has survived strongly in electrical
contracting where a relatively tight and comprehensive agreement
continues to operate.  Though the agreement may be less of a
‘standard’ than in the past, it is still a very effective ‘floor’ and far from
being a mere ‘safety net’, to use Brown and Terry’s terminology.  This
survival is to be explained by sectoral and industrial characteristics, by
the existence of a centralised trade union, and by the nature of
employer solidarity; it has also been sustained by institutions which
seem to work and by a particular historical and ideological legacy.
Strains on the system arise from some of Katz’s pressures, in particular
a growing diversification of both employer and employee interests and
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the felt need of some employers to obtain greater flexibility.  Pressures
also come from sectoral and industrial characteristics such as the
growth of self-employment and from specific changes such as the
waning impact of a particular historical legacy.
In the case of electrical contracting, national bargaining offers
some benefits in terms of industrial stability, good terms and
conditions, self-governing procedures, skill formation, and standards of
work.  Over the last 25 years, most employers and governments have
urged the advantages of decentralised bargaining, citing product market
and labour market imperatives; also, in the private sector at least, many
unions have favoured decentralisation.  Given the particular set of
circumstances in the electrical contracting industry and the growth in
other industries of single-employer bargaining or no bargaining, it is
unlikely that the arrangements in electrical contracting could constitute
a model for other British industries, though, as we have said, it has
been so used elsewhere in construction.  The arrangements do,
however, show that, where certain conditions exist and where
commitment can be developed, multi-employer regulation is possible.
In the construction sector, in particular, where the choice is not so
much between multi- and single-employer bargaining, but between
multi-employer and no bargaining, the model of electrical contracting
has something to offer.  Unless the circumstances of present day British
industrial relations change, it is unlikely that it will constitute a broader
model and in this respect it remains a largely deviant case.
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ENDNOTES
1  The same source indicates that there were 38,100 electricians in
1989, the latest date for which figures were available for the whole
of Great Britain.
2  Employment by electrical contractors fell from 50,800 to 44,000
between 1984 and 1994 and JIB employment as a proportion of
the total fell from 61 to 56%.  The density figure for electrical
contracting is our estimate and for construction it is taken from the
Labour Force Survey.
3   There are a few ECA firms which do not join and a few (about
200) non-ECA firms which do join.
4  Between 1984 and 1990, collective bargaining coverage declined
from 64 to 51% in private manufacturing and from 41 to 33% in
private services (WIRS 2 and 3).
5 See the discussion below of close movement in JIB rates and
earnings in the industry and the effectiveness of working
conditions.
 
6   An alternative approach to measurement of the relationship
between rates and earnings, adopted by Brown and Terry (1978)
and based on an artificial rate comprising the average of the major
skilled and unskilled rate compared with earnings minus overtime,
confirms this trend.
7   For the increased interest in quality, see ISO 9000 which
encourages a benchmark such as the employment of a qualified JIB
electrician.
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